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Abstract 
The Slovenian post-privatisation period has been characterised by a decline in the ownership by non-
managerial owners (employees) and state-controlled funds. On the other hand, domestic and foreign non-
financial firms, Privatisation Investment Funds and managers have been increasing their holdings. The 
latter, namely the growing managerial ownership, is likely to feature in future ownership dynamics in 
Slovenia. In fact, in 2002 the desired (optimal) ownership stakes estimated by Slovenian managers were 
10.8 percentage points higher than their actual stakes. The aim of our paper is to describe the main trends 
in the ownership of Slovenian corporations in the post-privatisation period and to provide an answer to 
the basic economic question: what is the influence of the ongoing consolidation of managerial ownership 
on the performance of Slovenian firms. The empirical analysis testing this relationship is based on a panel 
of 182 Slovenian firms in the 1995-99 period and does not provide relevant evidence of any positive 
effects of the increasing managerial control on Slovenian firms’ performance. If any, a positive incentive 
effect is only observed in those firms whose managers’ holdings exceed 10-percent, only with regards to 
firms’ financial performance (but not total factor productivity) and only in firms that are not listed on the 
capital market. Further, the negative effect of the current gap between the desired and actual managerial 
ownership seems to exceed any positive incentive effect arising out of managerial ownership 
JEL Classification: G30 
Keywords: managerial ownership, ownership consolidation, corporate performance, corporate 
governance, transparency 
1.  Introduction 
The Slovenian Law on Ownership Transformation (1992) introduced the change 
from social
3 to private ownership through a combination of voucher and cash 
privatisation; it provided for the allocation of 20 percent of firms’ shares to insiders, 20 
percent to the Development Fund for further sale to Privatisation Investment Funds 
(PIFs), 10 percent to the Pension Fund and 10 percent to the Restitution Fund
4. 
Workers’ councils in the firms were then empowered to allocate the remaining 40 
percent to either firm insiders (through insider buy-outs) or outsiders (through a public 
tender). More than 90 percent of firms undergoing privatisation opted for the first 
alternative (insider privatisation); inside owners ended up holding about 40 percent of 
the social capital subject to privatisation, 25 percent went to Privatisation Investment 
Funds, 22 percent to the Pension and Restitution Funds, while the remaining 13 percent 
was publicly sold in exchange for ownership certificates
5. Insider ownership prevailed 
                                                 
1 Professor, Law Faculty, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. 
2 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. 
3 That is, the ownership of capital and infrastructure by society as a whole. 
4 The Slovenian Pension Fund (or Capital Fund) and the Slovenian Restitution Fund are often referred to 
as state-controlled funds. 
5 About 2,000,900 ownership certificates of a total value of 9.4 billion German marks (40 percent of the 
total estimated book value of social capital) were distributed to the citizens of the Republic of Slovenia. 
The certificates were not transferable and could only be used for acquiring shares in internal 
distribution, internal buy-outs, and public offerings of shares and/or in the exchange for the shares of 
Privatisation Investment Funds. 218 
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mostly in smaller firms; inside owners obtained at least 60 percent of the voting rights in 
about 24.4 percent of firms, while their ownership did not exceed 10 percent in about 
6.3 percent of (mostly large) firms (Report of the Agency for Privatisation, 1999). 
Hence, Slovenia’s privatisation brought about two large groups of owners: inside 
owners  (employees, including managers, former employees and their relatives) and 
outside owners (Pension and Restitution Funds, Privatisation Investment Funds). 
Within the group of insiders, managers ended up holding only minority stakes (3.86 
percent) with the support of the employees as the main mechanism for ensuring their 
discretionary power and fighting the influence of outsiders (Prasnikar and Gregoric, 
2002; Gregoric, 2003).  
Due to the shrinking employee ownership and hence the reduction of the 
‘hidden’ support for managers in the post-privatisation period, Slovenian managers have 
started strengthening their power by expanding their ownership stakes
6. These increases 
have been most prominent in non-listed firms in which the transfer of ownership 
involves relatively low prices and mostly remains undisclosed to the public. Further, the 
remaining dissatisfaction of managers (at the end of 2002 the optimal or desired 
ownership stake of the average Slovenian manager exceeded their actual ownership 
stake by 10.8 percentage points
7) clearly indicates that the trend of rising managerial 
ownership in Slovenian firms will also continue in the future. The accumulation of 
ownership in the hands of managers is further motivated by the relatively low level of 
transparency of ownership transfers in Slovenia
8. In any case, it is not the aim of this 
paper to discuss the fairness of the observed redistribution of privatised capital, nor to 
deal with the importance of such redistribution for the preservation of domestic 
ownership
9 but to provide an answer to the basic economic question, namely what is the 
impact of the observed increases in managerial ownership on the performance of 
Slovenian firms. While similar empirical studies mostly estimate the relation between 
managerial ownership and firm performance in developed market economies, this study 
adds important evidence on the efficiency of managerial ownership in transition 
countries. Our data set also enables us to clearly differentiate between managerial and 
non-managerial (insider) ownership. Moreover, we are the first to take into account the 
‘non-optimality’ of the ownership structure, which resulted from privatisation, and to 
consequently distinguish between the desired (optimal) and actual ownership structure 
through the so-called ownership gap. 
We start in the second section with an overview of managerial ownership as a 
corporate governance mechanism in developed market economies; the section further 
provides evidence on the role of managerial and insider ownership in transition 
economies. Section 3 discusses the characteristics and the dynamics of the managerial 
and insider ownership in Slovenia. The fourth section states the main hypotheses on the 
                                                 
6 If managers prefer insider control, they will buy shares from the employees. This approach to 
entrenching their position may arise in particular when directors have been appointed before 
privatisation and are less optimistic about their employment prospects in the external managerial market 
and/or are less skilled. These arguments suggest the persistence of insider control in transition countries 
but with a reduction in employee shareholdings and a corresponding increase in managerial holdings 
(Wright et al., 2003; also see Blanchard  and Aghion, 1996).  
7 See Figure 3.1. 
8 The lack of transparency still characterises Slovenian ownership dynamics despite the recently proposed 
amendments to the Takeovers Act. See the proposed amendments to the Takeovers Act (31 July, 2003), 
currently undergoing parliamentary discussion (EVA 2003-2111-0051). 
9 For more on this issue, see Stiblar (2003).  
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influence of managerial ownership on firm performance in Slovenia. The main empirical 
models underlying the analysis of the relationship between managerial ownership and a 
firm’s economic efficiency and financial performance are presented in the fifth section. 
The sixth section sets out the main empirical results and the last section concludes. 
2.  Managerial ownership as a corporate governance mechanism 
The influence of managerial ownership
10 on enterprise performance is related to 
the view that a firm’s value depends on the distribution of ownership between managers 
and other owners, as first underlined by Berle and Means (1932) and, later on, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). Within this context and the so-called ‘incentive argument’, giving 
managers corporate shares makes them behave like shareholders. In an extreme case 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), we would have a firm with a single owner-manager and 
hence a complete alignment of the manager’s and owner’s incentives (no equity-related 
agency costs). The superior performance of firms with substantial managerial ownership 
could also be due to psychological reasons.
11 The theory of entrepreneurship, for 
example, promotes the idea that managers who are also large shareholders better 
perceive new business opportunities; as such, this theory complements the incentive 
theory somewhat since it provides an explanation of the positive effect of managerial 
ownership in firms with a relatively dispersed ownership structure. Bull (1989), for 
example, finds that due to this ‘entrepreneur effect’ firms that have been subject to a 
management buy-out normally perform better. After taking over the firm, managers in 
fact tend to concentrate on the maximisation of the cash flow rather than on the mere 
maximisation of current profits.  
However, the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance 
might not be monotonic since beyond certain levels equity incentives may lead to the 
expropriation (rather than improvement) of the firm’s value. By increasing their 
ownership and voting stakes, managers in fact gain the opportunity to expropriate some 
corporate funds on their own behalf and at the expense of other shareholders, namely 
to gain some ‘private benefits of control’. According to Barclay and Holderness (1991), 
the private benefits of control are one of the main reasons for the existence of 
blockholders around the world. If the desire to obtain these benefits overrules the 
incentive effect, managerial ownership could actually reduce a firm’s value (‘the 
entrenchment effect’). Excessive managerial ownership can also reduce the probability 
of a successful takeover and lead to ‘positional conflicts
12’ (Stulz, 1988). Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988) report that firms with majority managerial ownership pay more 
compensation to their managers than firms where the majority of shares are held by 
outside owners. 
 
                                                 
10 With regard to managerial ownership, the literature mostly refers to inside owners. However, given the 
specifics of the Slovenian privatisation and the substantial share of non-managerial owners (employees, 
former employees and their relatives) in the capital of Slovenian firms, we use the term ‘insider 
ownership’ when referring to the ownership of all inside owners, while we use the term ‘managerial 
ownership’ when referring exclusively to the shares held by managers. 
11 For example, Mueller, E. and Spitz, A. (2002) argue that a manager as a sole owner might feel more 
involved with the company and hence perform better.  
12 Managers try to protect their jobs even when they are inefficient. Shultz (1988) further finds that in 
firms with majority managerial ownership the probability of a hostile takeover equals 0. 220 
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In terms of the influence of the stated effects, empirical studies of market 
economies mostly evidence a non-monotonic relationship between managerial 
ownership and a firm’s performance. Mork, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find that firm 
performance (measured with the Tobin Q) rises as managerial ownership increases up to 
5%, falls up to the 25% level and then slightly rises again.
13 McConnell and Servaes for 
1,173 (1976) and 1,093 (1986) firms listed on the NYSE and AMEX find a similar 
relation (even when controlling for the firms’ size, industry and outliers); the 
performance rises up to 37% of shares, decreases between 37% and 50%, while 
afterwards the relation becomes less clear. Similarly, Hubbard and Palia (1999) also 
report a quadratic form of the relation between ownership and performance with the 
maximum at 58%, while for a sample of smaller firms in Germany, Mueller and Spitz 
(2002) report a positive effect of managerial ownership up to an 80-percent level. Again, 
other authors (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) argue that there is no relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm value since the ownership structure is an endogenous 
outcome of competitive selection in which various cost advantages and disadvantages 
are balanced out to arrive at an equilibrium organisation of the firm. Moreover, 
managers’ ownership is not exogenous but is an endogenous variable determined by 
different variables reflecting the business environment, firm characteristics, differences 
in the managerial contracting environment and, most importantly, the firm’s 
performance itself (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Cho, 1987). Empirical studies based on a 
framework of simultaneous equations, which take into account the endogeneity of the 
managerial ownership (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Mueller 
and Spitz, 2002), find no strong support for the notion that managerial ownership 
positively affects firm performance. 
Due to the specifics of transition and the specific function of insider and 
managerial ownership
14 the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance in 
transition is more complicated
15. Empirical studies in transition countries mostly report 
a negative (Earle and Estrin, 1997; Carlin et al. 1995; Frydman et al., 1999; Claessens 
and Djankov, 1998) relationship between insider (or managerial) ownership and firm 
performance. Wright et al. (2002), for example, observe that firms with relatively high 
managerial ownership are more reluctant to dismiss employees; the latter is, according to 
the authors, a reflection of the managers’ effort to gain support from the employees and 
hence preserve and further strengthen their privileged position. Firms with higher 
managerial ownership are characterised by lower managerial turnover and lower 
efficiency with respect to firms with more usual share of inside or outside ownership. 
The inefficiency of managerial ownership in Russian firms, corruption, political motives 
and incentives to expropriate the private benefits of control are also been reported as 
being related to managerial ownership by other studies (e.g. Boycko et al., 1994 and 
1996). 
 
                                                 
13 The authors perform a piecewise linear regression and control for factors that might jointly influence 
board ownership and firm value (R&D expenditures, advertising expenditures, debt-to-asset ratio, 
replacement cost of assets, industry effect). 
14 Managerial ownership in transition often acts as a tool to induce a desired change in ownership rather 
than as an incentive to increase enterprise performance. For more, see Claessens and Djankov, 1998. 
15 For the efficiency of insider ownership and managerial ownership with regards to firm restructuring and 
sales to outsiders, also see Blanchard O., Aghion, P.(1996).  
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For a sample of 706 Czech firms, Claessens and Djankov (1998)  find no 
significant relation between managerial incentives and firm performance; the entry of 
new, skilled managers (managerial turnover) seems to be more important for corporate 
performance than the equity incentives themselves. As argued by the authors, due to a 
weak market for general managers and hence little scope for managerial turnover, the 
value of incumbency benefits to incumbent managers becomes more important and can 
easily exceed the value of benefits from equity ownership. Further, with limited trading 
in equity shares the ability of managers to obtain the true value of their equity is 
reduced. Last but not least, in cases where incumbent managers received equity holdings 
for free they tend to undervalue their holdings, use them to further entrench their 
positions and continue operating as before (Claessens and Djankov, 1998). 
3.  Managerial and insider ownership in the Slovenian post-privatisation 
period 
Slovenian managers and employees in most cases fully exploited the opportunity 
to buy firm shares through buy-outs and obtained substantial capital stakes, especially in 
smaller firms; in larger firms large shareholdings were obtained by institutional investors 
(the state-controlled Pension Fund and Restitution Fund, Privatisation Investment 
Funds) and outside minority investors. With regards to the importance of the insider 
versus outsider distribution of shares and the rules of secondary share transactions, we 
mostly refer to two different groups of firms: 
 
-  Public (listed) firms whose shares are listed on the Stock Exchange 
since they were partly distributed to the public. There are currently 
about 140 listed firms in Slovenia; these firms are subject to detailed 
regulation regarding transparency and minority investors’ protection; 
and 
-  Non-public (unlisted) firms whose shares are not listed on the Stock 
Exchange and which did not opt for the public sale of shares while 
privatising. We further divide these firms into firms where insiders 
gained the majority share (insider firms) and firms where insiders 
gained less than a majority share (outsider firms). While inside 
owners control the decision-making in insider firms, they do not 
have such power in outsider firms but normally retain enough 
strength to oppose the most important decisions (sale of the firm to 
strategic investors, listing on the Stock Exchange etc.). In the latter, 
inside owners mostly have the willingness but lack the funds to buy 
out the outside owners (the Funds), while the outsiders stay passive 
in the area of governance or, when active, are largely opposed by the 
insiders. 
The ownership structure at the end of privatisation and the emerging 
characteristics of Slovenian privatisation are shown in Table 3.1, namely
16: 
 
1.  The percentage of capital in the hands of strategic owners is quite limited 
(2.3 percent in all firms); 
                                                 
16 The data refer to the study by Simoneti et al. (2001). 
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2.  Foreign owners have somehow been excluded from the privatisation 
process (0.33 percent share in all firms); 
3.  The state and state-controlled funds on average obtained 30 percent of 
firm capital (7.75 percent held directly by the state, 21.6 percent 
indirectly through state-controlled funds). The state keeps playing a 
relatively important role in the governance of Slovenian firms and, 
through the state-controlled funds, in some firms it remains the largest 
shareholder; 
4.  Outside minority investors who gained ownership during the public sale 
of shares represent a significant investor group only in a small number of 
firms listed on the Stock Exchange; 
5.  The two main investor groups (inside owners and institutional outside 
owners) ended up with similar capital stakes; inside owners prevail in the 
insider firms, while state-controlled funds and PIFs prevail in the 
outsider firms; 
6.  Institutional investors are not a homogeneous group since there are large 
differences between state-controlled funds and the privately managed 
Privatisation Investment Funds; 
7.  Inside owners include employees (on average, they gained 29.23 percent 
of firms’ capital), former employees (11.05 percent) and management 
(3.86 percent). This group of owners was relatively homogeneous, at 
least at the beginning of privatisation. We do not expect the group to be 
stable over time; former employees are most likely to exit while 
managers are probably going to increase their controlling power, 
especially in those firms where their interests do not coincide with the 
interests of employees.  
 
Table 3.1: Ownership structure at time of completed privatisation (N=183) 
Group of owners  All companies Listed Insider  Outsider
The state  7.75% 6.78% 2.02%  11.92%
Restitution and Pension Funds  21.60% 20.49% 21.28%  22.19%
PIFs (privatisation funds)  19.38% 17.65% 14.88%  22.99%
ALL Funds  40.98% 38.14% 36.17%  45.18%
Inside owners - managers   3.86% 1.40% 4.98%  3.95%
Inside owners – current 
employees 
29.23% 21.88% 38.08% 25.80%
Inside owners – former 
employees 
11.05% 7.48% 14.60% 9.89%
ALL Inside  44.14% 30.77% 57.66%  39.65%
Financial investors - domestic 4.80% 22.37% 0.63%  1.61%
Financial investors – foreign  0.03% 0.08% 0.00%  0.02%
ALL Financial  4.83% 22.45% 0.63%  1.64%
Strategic investors – domestic  2.00% 1.86% 3.55%  1.01%
Strategic investors – foreign   0.30% 0.00% 0.00%  0.60%
ALL Strategic  2.30% 1.86% 3.55%  1.61%
TOTAL (all groups)  100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  100.00%
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3.1 Ownership dynamics in the post-privatisation period 
The figures in Table 3.2 reveal the intensity of the decline in the number of 
shareholders in listed and unlisted firms in the 1999-2001 period. Most prominent in the 
first year after privatisation is the decline in the number of shareholders (including 
inside owners) in listed companies; the transfer of shares in these firms was in fact 
relatively easy and transparent. Shareholders in unlisted firms were more active in selling 
their shares in the years following 1999; the decline in the number of shareholders in 
these firms was mostly due to the sale of shares by employees in non-transparent (black) 
markets. 
 
Table 3.2: Dynamics of the number of shareholders in the years following privatisation  
(non-weighted averages) 
  At the time of 
completed 
privatisation 
1999  2000  2001 
Unlisted  100% 481  75% 360 64% 308 55% 265
 - insider  100% 470  71% 333 59% 276 51% 241
 -outsider  100% 492  79% 387 69% 340 59% 288
Listed  100% 7,497  61% 4,576 54% 4,085 49% 3,653
Total  100% 2,820  63% 1,765 56% 1,567 49% 1,394
Sources: KDD and Privatisation Agency 
 
Table 3.3: Changes in the ownership structure since the end of privatisation to the end of 
1999  (in percentage points) 
Group of owners  All 
companies
Listed Insider  Outsider
The state  -4.69 -3.98 -1.47  -7.09
Restitution and Pension Funds  -9.02 -6.49 -9.16  -9.78
PIFs (privatisation funds)  -2.13 1.37 -0.31  -4.54
ALL Funds  -11.15 -5.13 -9.47  -14.32
Inside owners - managers   5.17 1.45 4.09  7.16
Inside owners – current employees -2.19 -6.54 -4.52  0.85
Inside owners – former employees 0.35 -1.69 -1.39  2.21
ALL Inside  3.33 -6.78 -1.82  10.22
Financial investors - domestic  3.73 1.71 3.92  4.29
Financial investors – foreign  0.15 0.06 0.30  0.09
ALL Financial  3.88 1.77 4.22  4.38
Strategic investors – domestic  7.90 13.68 8.01  5.85
Strategic investors – foreign   0.72 0.44 0.52  0.96
ALL Strategic  8.62 14.12 8.53  6.81
Sources: Survey MEOR & CEEPN-2000 224 
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There have also been changes in the ownership structure of privatised firms (see 
Table 3.3). Employees’ ownership has been shrinking in the listed firms (-6.78 
percent)17, while inside owners in outsider firms have been increasing their stakes 
(+10.22 percent) and aiming to achieve the majority. In insider firms, insiders are mostly 
retaining majority stakes. 
Most evident within the group of inside owners is the increase in managerial 
ownership (+5.17 percent), while employee ownership has been decreasing (-2.19 
percent). The largest is the growth of managerial ownership in outsider firms (+7.16 
percent) and insider firms (+4.19 percent), while this trend is much slower in listed 
firms (+1.45 percent). 
 
3.2 The desired ownership structure from the managerial 
perspective 
 
The estimation of the desired (optimal) ownership structure is based on the 
responses of Slovenian managers to our questionnaires about the optimal ownership 
structure of their firms. Similarly to other transition countries (Claessens and Djankov, 
1998), managers have mostly been guiding the ongoing changes in terms of controlling 
Slovenian corporations. Hence, we expect the actual ownership structure to approach 
the desired level in the future years.  
The analysis of both trends up to 1999 and the desired ownership structure (see 
Table 3.4.) leads to the following conclusions: 
 
1.  The main trends characterising the first years after privatisation (up to 
the end of 1999) are expected to continue in the future: the ownership 
share of Funds will decline, mostly on account of an increase in the 
ownership of strategic investors (up to 23.4 percent) and managers (up 
to the stated 21.8 percent); 
2.  The PIFs will accompany the state-controlled funds (whose share 
declined most in the first period) in existing firms in the second period; 
3.  While former employees kept their average stake in the first period (up 
to 1999), they are expected to sell their shares in the future (the expected 
decrease of their proportion of shares is from 11.4 percent to 4.8 
percent); and 
4.  Foreigners are expected to appear among strategic investors in the 
second period (after 1999); their share in the capital of privatised firms is 
expected to rise from 1.02 percent to 6.21 percent. 
 
There is a high level of dissatisfaction associated with the degree of actual 
ownership seen at the end of privatisation. The actual share obtained by managers (3.86 
percent) is well below the desired average level (21.8 percent)
18; with regards to the 
                                                 
17 In these firms, it is very difficult for the employees to gain the majority share. Moreover, they can sell 
their share at transparent prices and on the organised capital market. 
18 The average level of managerial ownership is also relatively low with respect to other market and 
transition economies. For example, managers of corporations listed in the USA normally hold between 
20 and 40 percent of the voting rights and actively participate in the firm’s decision-making (Becht, 
2001; Holderness and Sheehan, 2001). Board members of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, 
for instance, represent the second most important group of blockholders and on average hold 11  
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latter, the reported desired (or optimal) level of managerial ownership varied among 
different firm groups (14.47 percent in listed firms, 20.54 percent in insider firms and 
25.14 percent in outsider firms). 
 
Table 3.4: The ownership structure of privatised Slovenian firms: the actual ownership 








End of  
1999 
Optimal  Change 
between 
Privatisation  






of 1999 and 
Optimal 
 
The state  7.75%  3.06% 1.55% -4.69 -6.20  -1.51
Restitution and 
Pension Funds 




19.38% 17.25% 6.44% -2.13 -12.94  -10.81
ALL Funds  40.98%  29.84% 11.31% -11.15 -29.67  -18.53
Inside owners 
– managers 










11.05% 11.40% 4.80% 0.35 -6.25  -6.60
ALL Inside 
 








0.03% 0.18% 0.61% 0.15 0.59  0.43
ALL 
Financial 








0.30% 1.02% 6.21% 0.72 5.91  5.19
ALL Strategic  2.30%  10.92% 23.14% 8.62 20.84  12.22
TOTAL 100.00%  100.00% 100.00%  
Sources: Survey MEOR & CEEPN - 2000 
                                                                                                                                          
percent of voting rights; about 65 percent of these shares are held by chief executives (Goergen and 
Reeneboog, 2001). Estrin et al. (1997) report a 17-percent managerial ownership, while substantially 
lower stakes (2.5 percent) have been reported for Czech Republic (Claessens and Djankov, 1998). 226 
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At the end of 1999, the difference between the actual and desired level of 
managerial ownership remained high (14.3 percent for outsider firms, 11.48 percent for 
insider firms, 11.62 percent for listed firms); the high level of dissatisfaction of 
Slovenian managers with the current ownership structure is further confirmed by our 
latest survey (end of 2001). As shown in Figure 3.1, Slovenian managers want their own 
stakes and the stakes of strategic investors to be higher (10.83 percentage points more 
for managers, 7.7 percentage points more for strategic investors), while the Funds (state-
controlled funds and PIFs) are expected to further decrease their participation in firms’ 
capital and control. Figure 3.1 clearly shows that Slovenian managers intend to boost 
their controlling power by increasing their own ownership stakes rather than by simply 
relying on the support of other inside owners. Managerial support for insider 
distribution and buy-outs as privatisation methods may well have been guided by the 
fact that managers perceived the insider (employee) ownership as a transitional phase, 
resulting in pure managerial ownership in the period following privatisation. Given that 
most of the stated changes have been going on in unlisted firms, the transparency of 
share transfers is crucial for shares to be transferred at ‘fair’ prices as well as for the 
efficiency of managerial ownership and its impact on firm performance in the future. 
 
Figure 3.1: Privatised firms: the desired ownership changes as reported by managers at the 
end of 2001 
           (in percentage points) 
 
4.  Managerial ownership and firm performance in Slovenia: the main 
hypotheses 
The observed increases in managerial ownership raise the question of the impact 
of these changes on firm performance in Slovenia in the 1995-1999 period. The growing 
ownership blocks could, on one hand, provide managers with incentives to maximise 
firm value; providing the right incentives to managers becomes even more important 
when considering the rent-seeking behaviour of outside, institutional investors and the 
relatively dispersed ownership structure that characterised Slovenian firms at the end of 
privatisation (see Prasnikar and Gregoric, 2002; Gregoric et al.; 2000; Nuti, 1997). In 
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managers are better at promoting the internationalisation of their activities, are most 
successful in exploiting market niches, developing new products and assign greater 
importance to financial goals; managers successfully balance the interests of different 
interest groups, while their power increases with the shares of inside owners. However, 
with large ownership stakes the desire to expropriate the private benefits of control 
might outweigh any incentive effect associated with managerial ownership. The desire 
for entrenchment could be particularly strong in Slovenia due to the importance of 
managers as stakeholders prior to transition (see Prasnikar and Svejnar, 1991), managers’ 
position in society, the low managerial turnover (see Knezevic et al., 2004) and the 
absence of an active managerial labour market. Given that employee ownership often 
represents ‘hidden’ support for managers (Gregoric, 2003), the entrenchment effect 
might prevail with relatively low managerial stakes. Hence, the following hypotheses 
emerge: 
 
H1: Managerial ownership on average has a positive impact on firm performance.  
 
H2: However, this relationship is non-monotonic since at some point entrenchment effects might 
prevail over the incentive effect. Due to insider support of managers, the absence of a managerial market 
and low executive turnover, the entrenchment effect might prevail already at low levels of managerial 
ownership. 
 
We further estimate the effects of managerial ownership with regards to the 
desired (optimal) level of ownership – the one aligning the ownership of each of the 
different stakeholder groups with their importance for the firm’s success and the one 
balancing the positive and negative effects of ownership. Here we assume the desired 
(optimal from the managerial point of view) ownership structure differs from the 
ownership structure resulting from privatisation; there was neither time nor the political 
willingness to search for the ‘optimal’ owners during privatisation. As a consequence, 
firms ended up with bigger or smaller differences between the actual and desired 
(optimal) ownership structure, namely with the so-called ‘ownership gap’. The estimated 
average ‘ownership gap’ and hence the estimated frustration with the actual ownership 
for the 182 firms in our sample is reported in Figure 3.1. The same figure could be 
drawn for any individual firm in our sample, with larger deviations from the optimal 
structure leading to higher managerial frustration (dissatisfaction) and hence worse firm 
performance.
19 Given the ‘management control bias’ in Slovenian firms after 
privatisation and hence the limited incentives stemming from the direct equity holdings 
of managers, we expect the frustration with managerial ownership to be most important 
with regard to its impact on firm performance
20. In this respect, we can draw the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H3: The optimal ownership structure, which ensures a high level of firm performance, is 
endogenous and determined (among other things) by the initial firm performance, firm size, industry, 
investment risk, sales’ variability, institutional and economic framework in which the firm operates. 
                                                 
19 Here we use a simple quantitative measure of the gap as the average difference between the optimal and 
actual ownership stake in percentage points for the different owner groups. For the 10 groups shown in 
Figure 3.1, this difference varies between 0 and 20 percent. 
20Managerial frustration is measured by the difference between the optimal and actual managerial 
ownership stake, in percentage points (varying between 0 and 100 percent for the firms in our sample). 228 
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H4: The Slovenian mass privatisation created a gap between the desired (optimal) and the 
actual ownership structure (ownership gap), which negatively influences firm performance. The larger the 
ownership gap (and hence the frustration with ownership) the worse the firm performance.  
 
The latter hypothesis implicitly means that increases in managerial ownership up 
to the desired ownership shares should have a positive impact on firm performance 
since they reduce managers’ dissatisfaction with the current ownership structure. On the 
other hand, increases of ownership that are above the desired ownership share should 
have a negative impact on firm performance. Hence,  
 
H5: Given the relatively high employee ownership (in relation to the desired level), we expect to 
observe a negative relationship between insider ownership and firm performance. On the other hand, 
given the relatively low initial managerial ownership we expect that increases in managerial ownership 
leading towards the optimal share will have a positive impact on firm performance. 
 
H6: The opportunities for gaining the private benefits of control are larger for managers than 
for other owner groups. Hence, we expect the managerial frustration with the actual ownership structure 
to have more prominent negative effects on firm performance. 
 
Given the characteristics of listed and unlisted firms (see Chapter 3.1), the 
reasons for share buying by management are expected to be quite varied. In listed firms, 
with limited under-pricing, managers are willing to increase their stake only when they 
expect the firm’s performance (and consequently their share value) to increase in the 
future. In unlisted firms, with substantial under-pricing, management can realise capital 
gains even if there are no positive effects on firm performance. 
 
H7: Since the managers of listed firms have been buying shares at market prices and in a 
transparent way and since in these firms their reliance on insider support is relatively limited, the positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance should be stronger than in unlisted 
firms where share transfers are often motivated by under-pricing and speculative reasons.  
 
While successfully acquiring shares in their firms, managers in this transition 
period are unwilling to damage the firm’s long-term performance and economic 
efficiency. This, however, might not be true with regard to the firm’s financial 
performance since these results are short-term and have to be shared with the owners 
who are about to exit the firm. By lowering firm financial results, managers also lower 
the price of shares they acquire. In the absence of outside financing, managers might 
actually effectively expropriate corporate funds in order to finance share acquisitions 
(e.g. debt financing of the acquisition of a firm’s own shares; cross-ownership 
arrangements; cross-financing of management share increases among related firms etc.). 
These negative effects on a firm’s financial performance are realised ex ante, namely 
prior to the actual increase of managerial ownership. Hence,  
 
H8: Managerial dissatisfaction (frustration) with the ownership share has a negative impact on 
the short-term, financial performance of firms, while no such effects are expected with regard to firms’ 
long-term economic efficiency. 
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H9: In the transition period (while approaching the optimal structure), a firm’s financial 
performance can be better explained by the planned increases in managerial ownership (which has a 
negative impact) than the actual increases in managerial ownership (which create incentives and hence 
positively effect the firm’s financial performance). 
5.  The empirical model and data 
The hypotheses on managerial ownership are tested on a sample of 182 firms in 
the period 1995-99. A detailed description of the firms in the sample is provided in 
Simoneti et al. (2001). Hypotheses on economic efficiency are tested with the Total 
Factor Productivity Model (TFP model) with estimations of the marginal production 
function constructed by regressing the 5-year cumulative changes in the employment of 
labour and capital on the 5-year cumulative increase in sales, while adding variables 
reflecting managerial ownership and controlling for industry. We therefore try to detect 
whether the changes in output which are not due to changes in capital or labour can be 
attributed to managerial ownership.  
The analysis of financial performance in the 1995-1999 period is based on the 
EBITDA/SALES ratio in 1999, regressed on initial financial performance, industry 
dummies and selected ownership variables. The EBITDA (an approximation of a firm’s 
operational cash flow) is a better measure of a firm’s financial performance (than, for 
example, profits) since it is most reliable and allows little accounting discretion
21. 
Similarly, the total sales value seems to be a more reliable measure than the value of 
firms’ capital or total assets. The initial firm performance is included in order to correct 
for the initial differences in firm performance. The main question is hence whether 
ownership characteristics, besides the initial performance levels and industry differences, 
contribute anything to explaining the differences in firm performance at the end of 
1999. 
A description of the variables used in the empirical analysis is provided in Tables 
5.1 and 5.2. Before testing the two models (TFP and financial performance) in our 
sample of 182 firms we tested the same 5-year cumulative models on a larger sample of 
firms. The results for the basic model (column 1) and for the models including dummies 
for privatisation methods (column 2) are presented in Table 5.3. The significant negative 
sign for insider and outsider firms confirms that, on average, listed firms perform better 
(both with regard to economic efficiency and financial performance), while correcting 
for initial firm performance (endogeneity of the selection of privatisation method). 
Similar results with respect to privatisation methods in Slovenia are reported by 
Simoneti et al. (2003a) using annual data for the same period, which confirms the 
validity of both models including when applied to 5-year data. In order to test the stated 
                                                 
21 Financial measures based on net profits are particularly problematic in Slovenia due to the peculiarities 
of the country’s accounting system, namely the treatment of the revaluation (revalorisation) of balance 
sheet items, which directly affect firms’ profits. Up until amendments to the Companies Act (2001) and 
the introduction of new Accounting Standards (SAS, 2002,) Slovenian firms stated their assets, claims, 
liabilities and capital at their actual values, revaluated on the basis of the retail index or, in the case of 
short-term investments and long-term investments in loans or liabilities, on the basis of an agreement 
with their creditors or debtors. Normally, this ‘revaluation’ reduced firms’ profits and caused an under-
valuation of Slovenian firms with respect to Western firms (International Accounting Standards only 
provide for this kind of revaluation in a hyperinflation scenario) and provided firms with a large amount 
of discretion in drawing up their financial statements.  230 
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hypotheses on managerial ownership, we proceed by replacing the privatisation 






Table 5.1: Description of the variables used in TFP model and financial model 
∆ sales  Change in output expressed as the difference of logarithms of sales for 
1999 and 1995. In analysing economic efficiency in the TFP model, the 
marginal production function was estimated on differences of logarithms 
(the estimated coefficients thus represent growth rates for a 5-year 
period). 
∆ labour  Change in employed labour in the 1995-99 period. 
 




Financial performance in the final year (1999) expressed as the ratio of 
operational cash flow (EBIT plus depreciation of assets) to sales (in %). 
 
Y0  Initial financial performance at the time of privatisation (1995). 
 
m1  Initial managerial ownership in privatisation (in %). 
 
m2  Final managerial ownership in 1999 (in %). 
 
n1  Initial insider ownership (managers, employees, former employees) in 
privatisation (in %). 
 




Squares of the ownership shares, included to test for non-linearity 
between performance and ownership of managers and inside owners. 
L, I, E  Dummies for listed companies (L = 1), internal unlisted companies (N = 




Correction factors to eliminate initial differences in performance across 
ownership groups of companies: L, I, E (so-called Mills' ratios). 
 
P1, P2, P3, P4 
 
Dummies for the level of legal protection of managers as shareholders: 
P1: m ≤ 10%, small shareholders 
P2: 10% ≤ m < 25%, minority shareholders without veto power 
P3: 25% ≤ m < 50%, minority shareholders with veto power  





















Table 5.2: Description of the ownership gap variables for all groups of owners, for managers 





Initial ownership gap in privatisation, expressed as the average absolute difference 




Final ownership gap in 1999, expressed as the average absolute difference 




Change in ownership gap 1995-99, expressed as the difference between GAP1 




Initial managerial ownership gap expressed as the difference between the desired 




Final managerial ownership gap, expressed as the difference between the desired 




Change in managerial ownership gap 1995-99, expressed as the difference 




Initial insider ownership gap (managers, employees, former employees) expressed 
as the difference between the desired and actual ownership share for inside 




Final insider ownership gap, expressed as the difference between the desired and 




Change in insider ownership gap 1995-99, expressed as the difference between 
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Table 5.3: Estimation of the basic 5-year cumulative models on a large sample before 
including the managerial (insider) ownership variables 
 
TFP Model  Financial Model 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) 




   




   



















 YES  YES 
Constant  YES YES YES YES 
Adj R2  0.6285 0.6410 0.2340  0.269 
F-stat 28.48  24.89  5.96  6.10 
No.  of  observation  407 389 407 389 




6.  Managerial ownership and firm performance. Empirical results 
The main results of the models testing the relationship between managerial 
(insider) ownership and firm performance are summarised in Table 6.1. The following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
 
1.  Managerial ownership usually has a positive effect on firm financial 
performance, while no such effect is observed for economic efficiency 
or total factor productivity growth. The hypothesis H1 hence holds true 
only for financial performance, which is mostly short-term oriented and 
a less important indicator of long-term firm performance; 
2.  The effect of managerial ownership on firm financial performance is 
positive and significant for unlisted firms, while this relation is not 
significant for firms listed on the Stock Exchange. Hence, managerial 
ownership in Slovenia does not seem to result from the alternative 
mechanisms of agency problem solving in firms with dispersed 
ownership (which is mostly the case for listed firms). One possible 
explanation is that the pressures of other outside owners in listed firms 
by themselves ensure good financial performance, while in unlisted firms 
(with passive outside owners) performance improves only with a higher 
managerial stake. The observed positive effect in unlisted firms  
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somewhat contradicts the H7 that managers in unlisted firms acquire 
shares (in the black market) only for speculative reasons and not for 
economic reasons; 
3.  The positive effect of managerial ownership is confirmed only for stakes 
exceeding 10 percent. The incentives for good financial performance for 
those managers holding below 10 percent of shares are probably too 
small to outweigh the private benefits of control that can be, given the 
relatively passive outside owners and the insiders’ support, gained 
irrespective of their ownership shares;  
4.  The finding stated in 3 above confirms the nonlinear relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance (consistent with 
H2). Contrary to developed market economies where managerial 
ownership first has a positive effect and the entrenchment effect prevails 
above a given share of managerial ownership, we observe an U-shape 
relationship for Slovenia. The estimated coefficients (-2.7 for m2 and 
0.084 for (m2)2) indicate that the function reaches its minimum at 16 
percent ownership, at which incentive effects (positive effects) prevail 
over entrenchment effects (see Figure 6.1). Hence, the standard 
explanation of managerial ownership as one of the mechanisms reducing 
the agency problem does not seem to fit into the Slovenian story. Here, 
we must bear in mind that due to passive outside owners (funds) and, on 
the other hand, passive and supportive inside owners, Slovenian 
managers already enjoyed substantial power at the end of privatisation, 
despite their relatively limited ownership shares. Hence, the private 
benefits of control that accrued to the managers are not directly linked 
to their ownership stakes but to the passivity of other owners. Hence, 
managers start behaving like real owners (and consequently are 
concerned about the firm’s financial performance) only when they reach 
a determinate ownership share; it is only at this point that their share is 
high enough for the incentive effect to prevail over the entrenchment 
effect;  
5.  The influence of insider ownership on firm financial performance is less 
clear; when significant, the relation is negative. When below 25 percent, 
insider ownership has a negative and significant impact on firm 
economic efficiency (TFP). With minority stakes, inside owners have no 
substantial power in corporate decision-making (e.g. the right of veto) 
and hence they find it more difficult to identify with the firm; 
6.  The negative influence of insider ownership is significant for listed 
companies, while no such effect is observed for unlisted firms. This is 
consistent with the finding in point 5 above since insider ownership 
tends to be lower in listed firms. Hence, private benefits prevail in the 
case of inside owners even with the higher investor protection in listed 
firms. In fact, inside owners share substantial decision-making power in 
Slovenian firms regardless of their actual ownership share; hence, with 
minority stakes employees have a low level of motivation to behave like 
owners and end up exploiting their ownership in order to consolidate 
their position in the firm’s decision-making.   
 234 
 








Table 6.1: Significance of managerial and insider ownership variables in TFP models and 
financial models, 1995-99 
           ( n = 1 8 0 )  
  TFP Model  Financial Model 
Management Ownership 
   
m1    
m2   (+)* 
∆m    
Listed (J=1); m2     
Non-listed (J=0); m2    (+)** 
[0%-10%] (P1=1); m2     
[10%-25%] (P2=1); m2   
[25%-50%] (P3=1); m2   
[50%-100%] (P4=1); m2   
 
(+)* 
m1, (m1)2    
m2, (m2)2    (-)** , (+)*** 
Insider Ownership     
n1    
n2    
∆n    
Listed (J=1); n2    (-)* 
Non-listed (J=0); n2     
[0%-10%] (P1=1); n2   
[10%-25%] (P2=1); n2 
(-)*** 
   
[25%-50%] (P3=1); n2     
[50%-100%] (P4=1); n2     
n1, (n1)2    
n2, (n2)2    















Table 6.1: Significance of managerial and insider ownership variables in TFP models and 
financial models, 1995-99      (n=180) 
  TFP Model  Financial Model 
Management Ownership     
m1    
m2   (+)* 
∆m    
Listed (J=1); m2     
Non-listed (J=0); m2    (+)** 
[0%-10%] (P1=1); m2     
[10%-25%] (P2=1); m2   
[25%-50%] (P3=1); m2   
[50%-100%] (P4=1); m2   
 
(+)* 
m1, (m1)2    
m2, (m2)2    (-)** , (+)*** 
Insider Ownership     
n1    
n2    
∆n    
Listed (J=1); n2    (-)* 
Non-listed (J=0); n2     
[0%-10%] (P1=1); n2   
[10%-25%] (P2=1); n2 
(-)*** 
   
[25%-50%] (P3=1); n2     
[50%-100%] (P4=1); n2     
n1, (n1)2    
n2, (n2)2    





Figure 6.1: The non-linear relationship between firm performance and managerial 
ownership:  
comparing Slovenia and developed market economies  
0% 15% 30% 45% 60% 75%
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In order to take into account the distribution of power between different 
stakeholders and the discrepancy between the actual and desired ownership structure, 
we perform further regressions with ownership gaps as explanatory variables. The 
results for both models are presented in Table 6.2 and may be summarised as follows: 
 
1.  The ownership gap has no significant effect on economic efficiency 
(TFP growth), while the effect on financial performance is negative and 
statistically significant, consistent with H8; 
2.  Managerial frustration has stronger negative effects on financial 
performance than the frustration of inside owners and the overall 
ownership frustration. The coefficients corresponding to the initial and 
final difference between optimal and actual managerial ownership are 
negative and highly significant. This is consistent with H6; the 
opportunities for expropriating the private benefits of control for 
unsatisfied managers are highest due to the initial ‘manager control bias’, 
which does not arise from managerial ownership but from the passivity 
of other outside owners; 
3.  We further confirm H8; while managerial frustration exerts a negative 
effect in the short-term, managers seem to behave rationally and do not 
jeopardise the firm’s long-term performance (TFP growth); 
4.  Two main tendencies can be observed when comparing Table 6.1 and 
Table 6.2: i) the actual managerial share is positively related to firm 
financial performance (see the row corresponding to m2 in Table 6.1); 
and ii) the planned increase in managerial ownership has a negative 
effect on firm financial performance (see the row corresponding to 
mGAP1 and mGAP2 in Table 6.2). In fact, our H9 predicts that the 
negative effect prevails during the transition towards the optimal 
managerial share. The hypothesis is confirmed by the results presented 
in Table 6.3, which includes the actual managerial ownership share 
(column 1), the planned increase in the managerial ownership (column 2) 
and both (column 3) as explanatory variables. When including both 
variables, the negative effect linked to the planned increases in 
managerial ownership (mGAP2) outweighs the positive incentive effect 
associated with the actual managerial ownership shares (m2); 
5.  A more detailed analysis (see columns 4 and 5 in Table 6.3) shows that 
the negative effect only prevails when managers hold less than 10 
percent of firm capital, while the positive effect prevails in those firms 
whose managers hold more than 10 percent. Hence, the ownership 
ambitions of managers with minority stakes are so high that this leads to 
lower financial performance. The latter may reflect the managers' 
attempts to influence the value of the firm’s shares or real factors, e.g. 
the consequences of the direct or indirect financing of share acquisitions 














Table 6.2: Significance of ownership gap variables in TFP models and financial models, 
1995-99 
  TFP Model  Financial Model 
All Group of Owners     
GAP1 – initial gap 
 
 (-)* 
GAP2 – final gap 
 
 (-)** 
Managers     
mGAP1 – initial gap 
 
 (-)*** 
mGAP2 – final gap 
 
 (-)*** 
Inside Owners  
   





Table 6.3: Financial models with actual managerial ownership (m2) and/or planned increase 
in managerial ownership (mGAP2) as explanatory variables 











































Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R2  0,1996 0,3181  0,2816  0,2857  0,4964 




151 150  150  122  28 




7.  Conclusions 
The empirical analysis of managerial ownership and firm performance in the 
Slovenian post-privatisation period does not provide any support for the conclusion 
that managerial ownership positively influences the long-term economic efficiency of 238 
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Slovenian firms (measured as total factor productivity growth). The percentage of firm 
capital in the hands of managers does however have some positive impact on the firm’s 
financial performance; the later is in any case outweighed by the negative effect 
associated with the planned increases in managerial ownership, especially in those firms 
where managerial frustration with the ownership structure is still relatively high. Poorer 
financial performance might have no real foundations and could simply be led by 
managerial efforts to reduce the value of firm shares; however, it is real when it results 
from managers’ expropriation of corporate funds for financing their share acquisitions. 
The first empirical results indicate that we can expect managerial ownership to 
have a positive effect (and hence create incentives) on firm financial performance, in 
particular in unlisted firms and in those firms whose managers hold more than 10 
percent of the capital. We find the main reasons for the nonlinear relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance in the initial management control bias, 
associated with the passivity of other owners rather than with the managerial ownership 
stakes. While this initial power provides managers with great possibilities to extract the 
private benefits of control, the incentive effect only seems to prevail when the 
managerial share exceeds the 10-percent threshold. On the other hand, the non-
transparent increase seen in managerial ownership in unlisted firms fortunately seems to 
have no negative effect on the economic efficiency and hence the long-term 
performance of Slovenian firms
22. 
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